Das Human Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure by Oded Galor & Omer Moav
Das Human Kapital:
A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure
Oded Galor and Omer Moav∗
March 18, 2004
Abstract
This paper hypothesizes that the demise of the 19th century’s European class structure
reﬂects a deliberate transformation of society orchestrated by the capitalists. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, it argues that the demise of this class structure was an outcome of a
cooperative, rather than divisive process. The research suggests that the transition from this
class structure may be viewed as the outcome of an optimal reaction by the capitalists to
the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their proﬁt rates. The paper argues
that the process of capital accumulation gradually intensiﬁed the importance of skilled labor
in the production process and generated an incentive for investment in human capital. Due to
the complementarity between physical and human capital in production, the capitalists were
among the prime beneﬁciaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They
therefore had the incentive to support public education that would sustain their proﬁtr a t e s
and would improve their economic well-being, although it would ultimately undermine their
dynasty’s position in the social ladder. The research suggests that Karl Marx’s highly inﬂuential
prediction about the inevitable class struggle due to declining proﬁt rates stemmed from an
under appreciation of the role that human capital would play in the production process. The
basic premise of this research, regarding the positive attitude of capitalists towards education
reforms, is supported empirically by a newly constructed data set of the voting patterns on
England’s education reform proposed in the Balfour Act of 1902.
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0“The history of society is the history of struggles between social classes”
Karl Marx
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the 19th century, Europe witnessed the onset of the decline of the existing class structure,
manifested by signiﬁcant educational and political reforms. This research hypothesizes that, in
contrast to the prevailing wisdom, the demise of the capitalists-workers class structure reﬂected
a deliberate transformation of society orchestrated by the capitalists in reaction to the increasing
importance of the human capital of workers in sustaining their proﬁt rates. The proposed theory
suggests that the accumulation of physical capital in the early stages of industrialization enhanced
the importance of human capital in the production process and generated an incentive for the
capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses, planting the seeds for the
demise of the existing class structure.
Existing theories about the demise of the capitalists-workers class structure focus on the role
of the class struggle in this signiﬁcant change. According to Marxist theory, capital accumulation
and the associated decline in proﬁt rates would intensify the degree of exploitation of workers and
would bring about a class struggle between workers and capitalists that would eventually terminate
the existing class society. The recent political economy literature accepts the basic Marxist premise
regarding increased tension between workers and capitalists as the prime catalyst for changes in
the social order. It suggests, however, that the transition in Western Europe during the 19th
century is an outcome of deliberate concessions of the elite designed to avert political instability,
expropriation, and possibly a revolution.1
The proposed theory, in contrast, suggests that the demise of the class structure was a
by-product of a productive cooperation between capitalists and workers, rather than an outcome
of a divisive class struggle. The theory argues that in the early stages of industrialization, when
physical capital was the prime engine of economic growth, societies were marked by a stable class
structure characterized by a dichotomous ownership on factors of production. Due to capital-skill
1The eﬀect of social conﬂict on political and educational reforms has been examined by Bowles and Gintis (1975),
Grossman (1994), Grossman and Kim (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000),
and Bertocchi and Spagat (2003), among others. They argue that reforms and redistribution from the elite to the
masses diminish the tendency for socio-political instability and predation, and may therefore stimulate investment
and economic growth. In particular, several studies examine the potential beneﬁts for the elite from educational
reforms. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) suggest that if political participation is determined by the education
(socioeconomic status) of citizens, the elite may not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to subsidize universal public education despite
the existence of positive externalities from human capital. Grossman and Kim (1999) argue that education decreases
predation, and Bowles and Gintis (1975) suggest that educational reforms are designed to sustain the existing social
order, by displacing social problems into the school system.
1complementarity, the accumulation of physical capital by the capitalists increased the importance
of human capital in sustaining the rate of return to physical capital and brought about a non-
altruistic change in the attitude of capitalists towards the provision of public education for the
masses.2 The capitalists found it beneﬁcial to support universal publicly ﬁnanced education, which
caused the main characteristics of the capitalists-workers class structure to gradually fade.3 The
research therefore suggests that Karl Marx’s highly inﬂuential prediction about the inevitable class
struggle due to declining proﬁt rates stemmed from an under appreciation of the role that human
capital would play in the production process.
The willingness of the capitalists to support universal public education rather than selective
industrial education captures two of the underlying forces in the complementarity between human
capital and physical capital. First, it appears that in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
the increase in basic literacy that was associated with universal primary education raised labor
productivity. Second, investment in universal primary education generated a wider talent pool for
advanced industrial and managerial occupations, beneﬁting the production process at the higher
end. The utilitarian support of capitalists for universal education enhanced the participation of
the working class in the process of human and physical capital accumulation, leading to a widening
of the middle class and to the eventual demise of the capitalists-workers class structure.4
The support for public education is unanimous among workers and capitalists, despite the
fact that the capitalists may carry the prime ﬁnancial burden of public schooling. That is, due to
the coexistence of credit market imperfections and capital-skill complementarity, the redistribution
associated with public education is Pareto improving.5 The distribution of the cost of education
between workers and capitalists may diﬀer across countries due to diﬀerences in their socio-political
s t r u c t u r ea sw e l la st h e i rs t a g eo fd e v e l o p m e n t . N evertheless, regardless of the distribution of
political power in society, in light of the importance of nourishment and health for human capital
2Since ﬁrms have limited incentive to invest in the general human capital of their workers, in the presence of
credit market imperfections, the level of education would be suboptimal unless it would be ﬁnanced publicly.
3The increase in inequality in mature stages of development due to skilled or ability-biased technological change
that is induced by human capital accumulation (e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu
(1998), Caselli (1999), and Galor and Moav (2000)) does not reﬂect a reversal in the demise of the class. It is not
related to class association as reﬂected partly by increased intergenerational mobility (e.g., Galor and Tsiddon (1997),
Maoz and Moav (1999), Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (2000)).
4Indeed, the second phase of the Industrial Revolution was associated with a widening middle class of white-collar
workers, skilled artisans, and independent entrepreneurs (Cameron (1989, p. 213)). Moreover, the development of
the middle class was encouraged by industrialists who demanded not only a more educated labor force but an
intermediate class of people who could serve in managerial and marketing positions (Anderson (1975, p. 193)).
5This result is related to Benabou (2000), who demonstrates that when capital and insurance markets are imper-
fect, policies which redistribute wealth from richer to poorer individuals can have a positive net eﬀect on aggregate
output and growth. Unlike the current study in which the support for growth-enhancing redistribution via pub-
lic education is unanimous, in Benabou (2000) redistributions are only supported by a wide consensus in a fairly
homogeneous society but face strong opposition in an unequal one. See Benabou (2002) as well.
2formation and labor supply, capitalists are unlikely to impose the prime ﬁnancial burden on the
working class as long as wages do not signiﬁcantly exceed the subsistence level of consumption.
This research develops a growth theory that captures the emergence of human capital ac-
cumulation as a prime engine of economic growth in the transition of the currently advanced
economies from the Industrial Revolution to modern growth. It demonstrates that the utilitarian
support of capitalists for the provision of universal public education was instrumental to the rapid
formation of human capital and was therefore a catalyst, and possibly even a necessary condition,
for the demise of the class society.
The theory is based on three central elements. First, the economy is characterized by
capital-skill complementarity.6 Capitalists therefore beneﬁt from the aggregate accumulation of
human capital in society. Second, human capital is inherently embodied in individuals and its
accumulation is subjected to decreasing marginal returns at the individual level. The aggregate
stock of human capital, therefore, would be larger if its accumulation would be widely spread among
individuals in society. Capitalists therefore beneﬁt from a universal provision of education. Third,
in the absence of public education, investment in human capital is suboptimal due to borrowing
constraints. Public education therefore enhances investment in human capital by the masses, and
may therefore beneﬁt the capitalists as well as the workers.7
Historical evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that, consistent with the proposed theory,
the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and
induced the capitalists to lobby for the provision of universal public education. Furthermore, as
suggested by the theory, the acquisition of human capital by the working class in the second phase
of the Industrial Revolution and the associated increase in wages, in particular relative to the
return to capital, brought about a decline in inequality and fading class distinction.
The basic premise of this research, regarding the positive attitude of capitalists towards
education reforms, is supported by the voting patterns on the Balfour Act of 1902 — the proposed
education reform in England that marked the consolidation of a national education system and
the creation of a publicly supported secondary school system. In light of the proposed theory, one
would expect that variations in the support of the Ministers of Parliament (MPs) for the Balfour
Act would reﬂect the variations in the skill intensity in the counties they represent. Higher support
for the Balfour Act would be expected from MPs who represent industrial skill-intensive counties.
We constructed a data set gathered from a variety of historical sources. The data combines
6See Goldin and Katz (1998) for evidence regarding capital-skill complementarity.
7See Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996), and Durlauf (1996) for the eﬀe c to fc r e d i tm a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n so n
investment in human capital and economic growth in an unequal society.
3home district and party aﬃliation of each MP with his voting record on the Balfour Act, the
percentage of employment in various agricultural and industrial sectors in the MP’s county, and
per-capita income, degree of urbanization, and religious aﬃl i a t i o ni ne a c hc o u n t y .T h ee m p i r i c a l
analysis supports the main hypothesis. It establishes that there exists a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of skill-intensiveness of the industrial sector in a county on the propensity of the MPs to vote in
favor of the education reform proposed by the Balfour Act of 1902.
2 Historical Evidence
Historical evidence suggests that, consistent with the proposed theory, the demise of the capitalists-
workers class structure reﬂected a deliberate transformation of society orchestrated by the cap-
italists in reaction to the increasing importance of the human capital of workers in sustaining
their proﬁt rates. In particular, Section 2.1 presents evidence that the process of industrialization
enhanced the importance of human capital in production and induced the capitalists to lobby for
the provision of universal public education. Section 2.2 provides evidence demonstrating that the
acquisition of human capital by the working class in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
and the associated increase in wages, in particular relative to the return to capital, brought about
a decline in inequality and fading class distinctions. Finally, Section 2.3 presents evidence that
dispel an alternative hypothesis that political reforms during the 19th century shifted the balance
of power towards the working class and enabled workers to implement education reforms against
the will of the capitalists.
2.1 Industrial Development and Education Reforms
Evidence suggests that the experience of the Western World throughout the various phases of
the Industrial Revolution is consistent with the hypothesis of this research about the link between
industrial development and educational reforms. The process of industrialization was characterized
by a gradual increase in the relative importance of human capital for the production process.
Indeed, as stated by Abramowitz (1993 p. 224), “In the nineteenth century, technological progress
was heavily biased in a physical capital-using direction...the bias shifted in an intangible (human
and knowledge) capital-using direction and produced the substantial contribution of education
and other intangible capital accumulation to this century productivity growth.” Furthermore, as
argued by Goldin (2001), “The modern concept of the wealth of nations emerged by the early
twentieth century. It was that capital embodied in the people – human capital – mattered.”
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, human capital had a limited role in the pro-
4duction process. Education was motivated by a variety of reasons, such as religion, enlightenment,
social control, moral conformity, socio-political stability, social and national cohesion, and mili-
tary eﬃciency. The extensiveness of public education was therefore not necessarily correlated with
industrial development and it diﬀered across countries due to political, cultural, social, historical
and institutional factors.
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, education reforms were designed primarily
to satisfy the increasing skill requirements in the process of industrialization, reﬂecting the interest
of capitalists in human capital formation and thus in the provision of public education. The
evidence suggests that in Western Europe, the economic interests of capitalists were indeed a
signiﬁcant driving force behind the implementation of educational reforms.
2.1.1 England
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), consistent with the proposed hypothesis,
capital accumulation increased signiﬁcantly without a corresponding increase in the supply of
skilled labor. The investment ratio increased from 6% in 1760 to 11.7% in the year 1831 (Crafts
(1985, p. 73)). In contrast, literacy rates remained largely unchanged and the state devoted
virtually no resources to raising the level of literacy of the masses. During the ﬁrst stages of the
Industrial Revolution, literacy was largely a cultural skill or a hierarchical symbol and had limited
demand in the production process.8 For instance, in 1841 only 4.9% of male workers and only
2.2% of female workers were in occupations in which literacy was strictly required (Mitch (1992,
pp. 14-15)). During this period, an illiterate labor force could operate the existing technology, and
economic growth was not impeded by educational retardation.9 Workers developed skills primarily
through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable.
The development of a national public system of education in England lagged behind the
continental countries by nearly half a century and the literacy rate hardly increased in the period
1750-1830 (Sanderson (1995, pp. 2-10)).10 As argued by Green (1990, pp. 293-294), “Britain’s
early industrialization had occurred without direct state intervention and developed successfully, at
least in its early stages, within a laissez-faire framework. Firstly, state intervention was thought un-
8See Mokyr (1993, 2001).
9Some have argued that the low skill requirements even declined over this period. For instance, Sanderson (1995,
p. 89) suggests that “One thus ﬁnds the interesting situation of an emerging economy creating a whole range of new
occupations which require even less literacy and education than the old ones.”
10For instance, in his parliamentary speech in defense of his 1837 education bill, the Whig politician, Henry
Brougham, reﬂected upon this gap: “It cannot be doubted that some legislative eﬀo r tm u s ta tl e n g t hb em a d et o
remove from this country the opprobrium of having done less for education of the people than any of the more
civilized nations on earth” (Green (1990, pp.10-11)).
5necessary for developing technical skills, where the initial requirements were slight and adequately
met by traditional means. Secondly, the very success of Britain’s early industrial expansion en-
couraged a complacency about the importance of scientiﬁc skills and theoretical knowledge which
became a liability in a later period when empirical knowledge, inventiveness and thumb methods
were no longer adequate.” Furthermore, as argued by Landes (1969, p. 340) “although certain
workers - supervisory and oﬃce personnel in particular - must be able to read and do the elemen-
tary arithmetical operations in order to perform their duties, large share of the work of industry
can be performed by illiterates as indeed it was especially in the early days of the industrial revolu-
tion.” The source of Britain’s industrial leadership in the 19th century was a favorable endowment
of resources, whereas Britain’s deﬁciency in the latter part of the century was a scarcity of human
capital which was essential in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution (Crafts and Thomas
(1986)).
England initiated a sequence of reforms in its education system since the 1830s and literacy
rates gradually increased. The process was initially motivated by a variety of reasons such as
religion, enlightenment, social control, moral conformity, socio-political stability, and military eﬃ-
ciency, as was the case in other European countries (e.g., Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland)
that had supported public education much earlier.11 However, in light of the modest demand for
skills and literacy by the capitalists, the level of governmental support was rather small.12
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, consistent with the proposed hypothesis, the
demand for skilled labor in the growing industrial sector markedly increased and the proportion
of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased from 11% in 1855 to 25% in 1870 (Flora
et al. (1983)). Job advertisements, for instance, suggest that literacy became an increasingly
desired characteristic for employment as of the 1850s (Mitch (1993, p. 292)). In light of the
industrial competition from other countries, capitalists started to recognize the importance of
technical education for the provision of skilled workers. As noted by Sanderson (1995, pp. 10-
13), “reading ...enabled the eﬃcient functioning of an urban industrial society laced with letter
writing, drawing up wills, apprenticeship indentures, passing bills of exchange, and notice and
advertisement reading.” Moreover, manufacturers argued that: “universal education is required
in order to select, from the mass of the workers, those who respond well to schooling and would
make a good foreman on the shop ﬂoor” (Simon (1987, p. 104)).
As it became apparent that skills were necessary for the creation of an industrial society,
11The proximity of the education acts in the UK to major wars suggests that the provision of public education
was partly a compensation for the services of soldiers.
12Even in 1869 the government funded only one-third of school expenditure (Green, 1990, pp. 6-7).
6replacing previous ideas that the acquisition of literacy would make the working classes receptive
to radical and subversive ideas, consistent with the proposed theory, capitalists lobbied for the
provision of public education for the masses.13 The pure laissez-faire policy failed in developing a
proper educational system and capitalists demanded government intervention in the provision of
education. As James Kitson, a Leeds iron-master and advocate of technical education explained to
the Select Committee on Scientiﬁc Instruction (1867-1868): “...thequestionissoextensivethat
individual manufacturers are not able to grapple with it, and if they went to immense trouble to
establish schools they would be doing it in order that others may reap the beneﬁt” (Green, 1990,
p. 295).14
An additional turning point in the attitude of capitalists towards public education was the
Paris Exhibition of 1867, where the limitations of English scientiﬁc and technical education became
clearly evident. Unlike the 1851 exhibition in which England won most of the prizes, the English
performance in Paris was rather poor; of the 90 classes of manufacturers, Britain dominated
only in 10. Lyon Playfair, who was one of the jurors, reported that: “a singular accordance of
opinion prevailed that our country has shown little inventiveness and made little progress in the
peaceful arts of industry since 1862.” This lack of progress “upon which there was most unanimity
conviction is that France, Prussia, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland possess good systems of
industrial education and that England possesses none” (Green (1990, p. 296)).15
In 1868, the government established the Parliamentary Select Committee on ScientiﬁcE d -
ucation. This was the origin of nearly 20 years of various parliamentary investigations into the
relationship between science, industry, and education, that, according to the proposed theory, were
designed to address the capitalists’ outcry about the necessity of universal public education. A
sequence of reports by the committee in 1868, The Royal Commission on ScientiﬁcI n s t r u c t i o na n d
the Advancement of Science during the period 1872-75, and by The Royal Commission on Technical
Education in 1882, underlined the inadequate training for supervisors, managers and proprietors,
as well as workers. They argued that most managers and proprietors do not understand the man-
ufacturing process and thus, fail to promote eﬃciency, investigate innovative techniques or value
the skills of their workers (Green (1990, pp. 297-298)). In particular, W. E. Forster, the Vice
13As hypothesized in this paper, there was a growing consensus among workers and capitalists about the virtues
of reform. The labor union movement was increasingly calling for a national system of non-sectarian education.
The National Education League (founded in 1869 by radical Liberals and Dissenters) demanded a free, compulsory,
non-sectarian national system of education (Green, 1990, p. 302).
14Indeed, the Factory Act of 1802 required owners of textile mills to provide elementary instruction for their
apprentices, but the law was poorly enforced (Cameron (1989, p. 216-217)).
15Moreover, the Nussey brothers, who had written a report on woolen textiles at the Exhibition, returned to Leeds
to start a movement for a Yorkshire College of Science.
7President of the committee of the Council of Education told The House of Commons: “Upon
the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial prosperity...if we leave our
work-folk any longer unskilled...they will become overmatched in the competition of the world”
(Hurt (1971, pp. 223-224)). The reports made various recommendations which highlighted the
need to redeﬁne elementary schools, to revise the curriculum throughout the entire school system,
particularly with respect to industry and manufacture, and the improve teacher training.
In addition, in 1868, secondary schools were investigated by the Schools Inquiry Commission,
which found a very unsatisfactory level for the vast majority of schools that employed untrained
teachers and used antiquated methods. Their main proposal was to organize a state inspection
of secondary schools and to provide eﬃcient education geared towards the speciﬁc needs of its
consumers. In particular, The Royal Commission on Technical Education of 1882 conﬁrmed that
England was being overtaken by the industrial superiority of Prussia, France and the United States
and recommended the introduction of technical and scientiﬁc education into secondary schools.
As argued in the proposed theory, it appears that the government gradually yielded to
the pressure by capitalists as well as labor unions, as reﬂected by its increased contributions to
elementary as well as higher education. In the 1870 Education Act, the government assumed
responsibility for ensuring universal elementary education, although it did not provide either free
or compulsory education at the elementary level. The Act created a national provision without
an integrated system, where voluntary schools existed beside state schools. In 1880, prior to the
signiﬁcant extension of the franchise of 1884 that made the working class the majority in most
industrial counties, education was made compulsory throughout England. The 1889 Technical
Instruction Act allowed the new local councils to set up technical instruction committees, and the
1890 Local Taxation Act provided public funds that could be spent on technical education (Green,
1990, p. 299).
School enrollment of 10-year-olds increased from 40% in 1870 to 100% in 1900, the literacy
rate among men, which was stable at around 65% in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution,
increased signiﬁcantly during the second phase reaching nearly 100% at the end of the 19th century
(Clark (2002)), and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased signiﬁcantly
in the second half of the 19th century, from 11% in 1855 to 74% in 1900 (Flora et al. (1983)).
Finally, the 1902 Balfour Act marked the consolidation of a national education system and created
state secondary schools (Ringer (1979) and Green (1990, p. 6)).16 Furthermore, science and
16The English secondary institutions were initially ﬁnancially independent from the state and their recruitment
was more socially exclusive than in other countries in Europe. Children from the upper middle class, professional,
business and commercial backgrounds dominated secondary schools. However, they often included lower middle class
8its application in technology gained prominence (Mokyr (1990, 2002)). New universities were
established in Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheﬃeld, Newcastle, Bristol, and London with a
strong emphasis on professional training in the medical, legal, engineering and economic studies
neglected at Oxford and Cambridge, and science schools were established and ﬁnanced through
the Department of Science (Sanderson (1995, p. 47)).
2.1.2 Continental Europe
The early development of public education occurred in the western countries of continental Europe
(e.g., Prussia, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands) well before the Industrial Revolution. The
process was motivated by a variety of reasons, such as religion, enlightenment, social control, moral
conformity, socio-political stability, social and national cohesion, and military eﬃciency. However,
as was the case in England, massive educational reforms occurred in the second half of the 19th
century due to the rising demand for skills in the process of industrialization. As noted by Green
(1990, pp. 293-294) “In continental Europe industrialization occurred under the tutelage of the
state and began its accelerated development later when techniques were already becoming more
scientiﬁc; technical and scientiﬁc education had been vigorously promoted from the center as an
essential adjunct of economic growth and one that was recognized to be indispensable for countries
which wished to close Britain’s industrial lead.”
In France, indeed, the initial development of the education system occurred well before the
Industrial Revolution, but the process was intensiﬁed and transformed to satisfy industrial needs in
the second phase of the Industrial Revolution. The early development of elementary and secondary
education in the 17th and 18th centuries was dominated by the church and religious orders. Some
state intervention in technical and vocational training was designed to reinforce development in
commerce, manufacturing and military eﬃciency. After the French Revolution, the state estab-
lished universal primary schools. Nevertheless, enrolment rates remained rather low. The state
concentrated on the development of secondary and higher education with the objective of produc-
ing an eﬀective elite to operate the military and governmental apparatus. Secondary education
remained highly selective, oﬀering general and technical instruction largely to the middle class
(Green (1990, pp. 135-137 and 141-142)). Legislative proposals during the National Convention
quoted by Cubberley (1920, pp. 514-517) are revealing about the underlying motives for education
inthisperiod: “...Childrenofallclassesweretoreceivethatﬁrst education, physical, moral and
intellectual, the best adapted to develop in them republican manners, patriotism, and the love of
and artisan families. (Green, 1990, p.20).
9labor...They are to be taken into the ﬁelds and workshops where they may see agricultural and
mechanical operations going on...”
The process of industrialization in France and the associated increase in the demand for
skilled labor, as well as the breakdown of the traditional apprenticeship system, signiﬁcantly af-
fected the attitude towards education. State grants for primary schools were gradually increased in
the 1830s and legislation made an attempt to provide primary education in all regions, extend the
higher education, and provide teacher training and school inspections. The number of communities
without schools fell by 50% from 1837 to 1850 and as the inﬂuence of industrialists on the struc-
ture of education intensiﬁed, education became more stratiﬁed according to occupational patterns
(Anbderson (1975 p. 15, 31)). According to Green (1990, p.157): “[This] legislation...reﬂected
the economic development of the period and thus the increasing need for skilled labor.” The ea-
gerness of capitalists for rapid education reforms was reﬂected by the organization of industrial
societies that ﬁnanced schools specializing in chemistry, design, mechanical weaving, spinning, and
commerce (Anderson (1975, p 86, 204)).
As was the case in England, industrial competition led industrialists to lobby for the provision
of public education. The Great Exhibition of 1851 and the London Exhibition of 1862 created the
impression that the technological gap between France and other European nations was narrowing
and that French manufacturers ought to invest in the education of their labor force to maintain
their technological superiority. Subsequently, the reports on industrial education by commissions
established in the years 1862 to 1865 reﬂected the plea of industrialists for the provision of industrial
education on a large scale and for the implementation of scientiﬁc knowledge in the industry. “The
goal of modern education...cannolongerbetoformmenofletters,idleadmirersofthepast,but
men of science, builders of the present, initiators of the future.”17 (Anderson (1975, p. 194)).
Education reforms in France were extensive in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution,
and by 1881 a universal, free, compulsory and secular primary school system had been established
and technical and scientiﬁc education further emphasized. Illiteracy rates among conscripts tested
at the age of 20 declined gradually from 38% in 1851-55 to 17% in 1876-80 (Anderson (1975, p.
158)), and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in primary schools increased from 51.5% in 1850
to 86% in 1901 (Flora et al. (1983)). Hence, consistent with the proposed theory, the process of
industrialization, and the increase in the demand for skilled labor in the production process, led
industrialists to support the provision of universal education, contributing to the extensiveness of
education as well as to its focus on industrial needs.
17L’Enseignement professionnel, ii (1864), p. 332, quoted in Anderson (1975).
10In Prussia, as well, the initial steps towards compulsory education took place at the beginning
of the 18th century well before the Industrial Revolution. Education was viewed at this stage
primarily as a method to unify the state. In the second part of the 18th century, education was
made compulsory for all children aged 5 to 13. Nevertheless, these regulations were not strictly
enforced due to the lack of funding associated with the diﬃculty of taxing landlords for this purpose,
and due to the loss of income from child labor. At the beginning of the 19th century, motivated
by the need for national cohesion, military eﬃciency, and trained bureaucrats, the education
system was further reformed, establishing provincial and district school boards, making education
a secular activity and compulsory for a three-year period, and reconstituting the Gymnasium as
a state institution providing nine years of education for the elite (Cubberly (1920) and Green
(1990)).
The process of industrialization in Prussia and the associated increase in the demand for
skilled labor led to signiﬁcant pressure for educational reforms and thereby to the implementation
of universal elementary schooling. Taxes were imposed to ﬁnance the school system and teacher
training and certiﬁcation were established. Secondary schools started to serve industrial needs as
well, and the Realschulen, which emphasized the teaching of mathematics and science, was gradu-
ally adopted, and vocational and trade schools were founded. Total enrolment in secondary school
increased sixfold from 1870 to 1911 (Flora et al. (1983)). “School courses...had the function of
converting the occupational requirements of public administration, commerce and industry into
educational qualiﬁcations...” (Muller (1987, pp. 23-24)). Furthermore, the Industrial Revolu-
tion signiﬁcantly aﬀected the nature of education in German universities. German industrialists
who perceived advanced technology as the competitive edge that could boost German industry,
lobbied for reforms in the operation of universities, and oﬀered to pay to reshape their activities
so as to favor their interest in technological training and industrial applications of basic research
(McClelland (1980, p. 300-301)).
The structure of education in the Netherlands also reﬂected the interest of capitalists in the
skill formation of the masses. In particular, as early as the 1830s, industrial schools were established
and funded by private organizations, representing industrialists and entrepreneurs. Ultimately, in
the latter part of the 19th century, the state, urged by industrialists and entrepreneurs, started to
support these schools (Wolthuis (1999, pp. 92-93, 119, 139-140, 168, 171-172)).
112.1.3 United States
The process of industrialization in the US also increased the importance of human capital in the
production process. Evidence provided by Abramowitz and David (2000) and Goldin and Katz
(2001) suggests that over the period 1890-1999, the contribution of human capital accumulation
to the growth process of the United States nearly doubled.18 As argued by Goldin (1999), the
rise of the industrial, business and commerce sectors in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in-
creased the demand for managers, clerical workers, and educated sales personnel who were trained
in accounting, typing, shorthand, algebra, and commerce. Furthermore, in the late 1910s, tech-
nologically advanced industries demanded blue-collar craft workers who were trained in geometry,
algebra, chemistry, mechanical drawing, etc. The structure of education was transformed in re-
sponse to industrial development and the increasing importance of human capital in the production
process, and American high schools adapted to the needs of the modern workplace of the early
20th century. Total enrolment in public secondary schools increased 70-fold from 1870 to 1950.19
Nevertheless, due to diﬀerences in the structure of education ﬁnance in the US in comparison
to European countries, capitalists in the US had only limited incentives to lobby for the provision
of education and support it ﬁnancially. Unlike the central role that government funding played in
the provision of public education in European countries, the evolution of the education system in
the US was based on local initiatives and funding. The local nature of the education initiatives
in the US induced community members, in urban as well as rural areas, to play a signiﬁcant role
in advancing their schooling system. American capitalists, however, faced limited incentives to
support the provision of education within a county in an environment where labor was mobile
across counties and the beneﬁts from educational expenditure in one county may be reaped by
employers in other counties. “The impetus to expand education to the secondary level was primarily
a grassroots movement led by parents, employers, and even young people themselves” (Goldin
(1999)).
2.2 Schooling, Factor Prices and Inequality
The main hypothesis of this research suggests that in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution,
prior to the implementation of signiﬁcant education reforms, physical capital accumulation was
18It should be noted that literacy rates in the US were rather high prior to this increase in the demand for
skilled labor. Literacy rates among the white population were already 89% in 1870, 92% in 1890, and 95% in 1910
(Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000)). Education in earlier periods was motivated by social control, moral conformity,
and social and national cohesion, as well as required skills for trade and commerce. In particular, Field (1976)
and Bowles and Gintis (1975) argue that educational reforms are designed to sustain the existing social order, by
displacing social problems into the school system.
19See Kurian (1994).
12the prime engine of economic growth and the concentration of capital among the capitalist class
widened wealth inequality. Once education reforms were implemented, however, the signiﬁcant
increase in the return to labor relative to capital, as well as the signiﬁcant increase in the real
return to labor and the associated accumulation of assets by the workers, brought about a decline
in inequality and eventually the demise of the European 19th century class structure.20
The theory predicts that in the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, prior to the imple-
mentation of education reforms, capital accumulation brought about a gradual increase in wages
along with an increase in the wage-rental ratio. Education reforms in the second phase of the
Industrial Revolution are predicted to generate a sharp increase in real wages along with a sharp
increase in the wage-rental ratio. Finally, wealth inequality is predicted to widen in the ﬁrst phase
of the Industrial Revolution and to reverse its course in the second phase, once signiﬁcant education
reforms have been implemented.
Indeed, evidence from the UK supports this hypothesis. As documented by Willimason
(1985) and depicted in Figure 1(b) for the time period 1823-1915, wealth inequality in the UK
reached a peak around 1870 and declined thereafter, in close association with the patterns of
enrolment rates and factor prices, depicted in Figures 1(a), 1(c) and 1(d).21 It appears that the
decline in inequality is indeed associated with the signiﬁcant changes that occurred around 1870
in the relative returns to the main factors of production possessed by capitalists and workers. As
depicted in Figures 1(c) and 1(d), based on the data set of Clark (2002, 2003),22 r e a lw a g e sa sw e l l
as the wage-rental ratio increase dramatically as of 1870.23 These changes in factor prices reﬂect
the increase in enrolment rates — in particular the process of education reforms from 1830 to 1870
and its consolidation in the Education Act of 1870 — and its delayed eﬀect on the skill level per
worker.24
Similar patterns of the eﬀect of education on factor prices and therefore on inequality are
20A similar prediction would emerge if an increase in labor augmenting technological progress would take place
and would thereby raise the relative return to labor, bring about a decline in inequality. However, as discussed in
the case of the UK, this is inconsistent with the contribution of TFP growth for output growth over this period.
21It should be noted that the return to capital increased moderately over this period, despite the increase in the
supply of capital, reﬂecting technological progress, population growth, and accumulation of human capital.
22Clark (2003) constructs three series for wages in England over this period. Farm wage, Helper Wage, and
Craftsmen Wage. Figures 1(c) and 1(d) are based on Helper wage. Nearly identical time path will emerge if wages
of Craftsmen will be used instead of wages of Helper. Farm wage appears less relevant given the focus of the paper.
23Stokey (2001)’s quantitative study attributes about half of the rise in real wage over the period 1780-1850 to
the forces of international trade. Moreover, technological change in manufacturing was 3 times as important as
technological change in the energy sector in contributing to output growth.
24Throughout the period 1873-1913 in which real wages increase signiﬁcantly, the growth rate of output per capita
is explained entirely by the contributions of physical and human capital accumulation. Thus, TFP growth is zero
over this period, depicting a marked decline over a 0.6% annual TFP growth in the period 1856-1873. (Mattews et
al. (1982)). An increase in labor-augmenting technological change is therefore not a viable explanation for relative
and absolute increases in real wages and the decline in inequality in the UK over this period.
13observed in France as well. As argued by Morrisson and Snyder (2000), wealth inequality in France
increased during the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, and as depicted in Figure 2(b), started to decline
in the last decades of the 19th century in close association with the patterns of enrolment rates
and factor prices, depicted in Figures 2(a), 2(c) and 2(d). The decline in inequality in France
appears to be associated with the signiﬁcant changes in the relative returns to the main factors
of production possessed by capitalists and workers in the second part of the 19th century. As
depicted in Figures 2(c) and 2(d), based on the data presented in Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon
(1990), real wages as well as the wage-rental ratio increase signiﬁcantly as of 1860, reﬂecting the
eﬀect of the increase in enrolment rates on the skill level per worker.
The German experience is consistent with this pattern as well. Inequality in Germany
peaked towards the end of the 19th century (Morrisson and Snyder (2000)) in association with a
signiﬁcant increase in the real wages and in the wage-rental ratio from the 1880s (Spree (1977) and
Berghahn (1994)), which is in turn related to the provision of industrial education in the second
half of the 19th century.
The link between the expansion of education and the reduction in inequality is present in
the US as well. Wealth inequality in the US, which increased gradually from colonial times until
the second half of the 19th century, reversed its course at the turn of the century and maintained
its declining pattern during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century (Lindert and Williamson (1976)). As
argued by Goldin (2001), the emergence of the “new economy” in the early 20th century increased
the demand for educated workers. The creation of publicly funded mass modern secondary schools
from 1910 to 1940 provided general and practical education, contributed to workers productivity
and opened the gates for college education. This expansion facilitated social and geographic
mobility and generated a large decrease in inequality in economic outcomes.
2.3 The Timing of Educational and Political Reforms
This research argues that education reforms were initiated by the capitalists in reaction to the
increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their proﬁt rates. An alternative hypothesis
may be that political reforms during the 19th century shifted the balance of power towards the
working class, and enabled workers to implement education reforms against the will of the elite.25
The evidence, however, does not support this alternative hypothesis.
Education reforms took place in autocratic states that did not relinquish political power
throughout the 19th century, and major reforms occurred in societies in the midst of the process of
25See for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), where the extension of the franchise during the 19th century
is viewed as a commitment devise ensuring future income redistribution from the elite to the masses.
14democratization well before the stage at which the working class constituted the majority among
the voters.
In particular, the most signiﬁcant education reforms in the UK were completed before the
voting majority shifted to the working class. The patterns of education and political reforms in the
UK during the 19th century are depicted in Figure 3(a). The Reform Act of 1832 nearly doubled
the total electorate, but nevertheless only 13% of the voting-age population were enfranchised.
The artisans, the working classes, and some sections of the lower middle classes remained outside
of the political system. The franchise was extended further in the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884
and the total electorate nearly doubled in each of these episodes. However, working-class voters
did not become the majority in all urban counties until 1884 (Craig (1989)).
The onset of England’s education reforms, and in particular, the fundamental Education
Act of 1870 and its major extension in 1880 occurred prior to the political reforms of 1884 that
made the working class the majority in most counties. As depicted in Figure 3(a), a trend of
signiﬁcant increase in primary education was established well before the extension of the franchise
in the context of the 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts. In particular, the proportion of children aged 5
to 14 in primary schools increased ﬁve-fold (and surpassed 50%) over the three decades prior to the
qualitative extension of the franchise in 1884 in which the working class was granted a majority
in all urban counties. Furthermore, the political reforms do not appear to have any eﬀect on the
pattern of education reform. In fact, the average growth rate of education attendance from decade
to decade over the period 1855 to 1920 reaches a peak at around the Reform Act of 1884 and starts
declining thereafter. It is interesting to note, however, that the abolishment of education fees in
nearly all elementary schools occurs only in 1891, after the Reform Act of 1884, suggesting that
the political power of the working class may have aﬀected the distribution of education cost across
the population, but consistent with the proposed thesis, the decision to educate the masses was
taken independently of the political power of the working class.
In France, as well, the expanding pattern of education preceded the major political reform
that gave the voting majority to the working class. The patterns of education and political reforms
in France during the 19th century are depicted in Figure 3(b). Prior to 1848, restrictions limited
the electorate to less than 2.5% of the voting-age population. The 1848 revolution led to the
introduction of nearly universal voting rights for males. Nevertheless, the proportion of children
aged 5 to 14 in primary schools doubled (and exceeded 50%) over the two decades prior to the
qualitative extension of the franchise in 1848 in which the working class was granted a majority
among voters. Furthermore, the political reforms of 1848 do not appear to have any eﬀect on the
15pattern of education expansion.
A similar pattern occurs in other European countries. Political reforms in the Netherlands
did not aﬀect the trend of education expansion and the proportion of children aged 5 to 14 in
primary schools exceeded 60% well before the major political reforms of 1887 and 1897. Similarly,
the trends of political and education reforms in Sweden, Italy, Norway, Prussia and Russia do not
lend credence to the alternative hypothesis.
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider a closed overlapping-generations economy in a process of development. In every period the
economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment.
The good is produced using physical capital and human capital. Output per-capita grows over
time due to the accumulation of these factors of production.26 The stock of physical capital in
every period is the output produced in the preceding period net of consumption and human capital
investment, whereas the stock of human capital in every period is determined by the aggregate
level of public education in the preceding period.27
3.1 Production of Final Output
Production occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale, production
technology. The output produced at time t, Yt, is
Yt = F(Kt,H t) ≡ Htf(kt)=AHtkα
t ; kt ≡ Kt/Ht; α ∈ (0,1), (1)
where Kt and Ht are the quantities of physical capital and human capital (measured in eﬃciency
units) employed in production at time t, and A is the level of technology.28 The production func-
tion, f(kt), is therefore strictly monotonic increasing, strictly concave satisfying the neoclassical
boundary conditions that assure the existence of an interior solution to the producers’ proﬁt-
maximization problem.
26Earlier growth models that focus on the role of physical and human capital in the process of development include,
for instance, Lucas (1988), Caballe and Santos (1993) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993). These models abstract
from the analysis of income heterogeneity and credit market imperfections, and therefore, do not study the incentives
of the rich to subsidize the education of the poor.
27The model abstracts from international factor movements. Land abundance in America have generated incentives
for outﬂow of labor from Europe to America, intensifying the problem of labor scarcity and preventing the use of
labor inﬂow (rather than investment in human capital) as a remedy for labor scarcity. In contrast, as argued by
Taylor (1999) and ORourke, Taylor and Williamson (1996), international capital outﬂow from Britain was signiﬁcant
during the 19th century and hence could alleviate some of the need to invest in human capital in order to sustain
the proﬁtr a t e s .
28The abstraction from technological change is merely a simplifying assumption. As will become apparent, the
introduction of endogenous technological change would not aﬀect the qualitative results. It should be noted, however,
that this simpliﬁcation is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that TFP growth over the relevant period
for this study is negligible and output growth is based primarily on factor accumulation.
16Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per eﬃciency
unit of labor, wt, and the rate of return to capital, rt , producers in period t choose the level of
employment of capital, Kt, and eﬃciency units of labor, Ht, so as to maximize proﬁts. That
is, {Kt,H t} =a r gm a x[ Htf(kt) − wtHt − rtKt]. The producers’ inverse demand for factors of
production is therefore
rt = f0(kt)= αAkα−1
t ≡ r(kt);




In every period a generation which consists of a continuum of individuals of measure 1 is born. Each
individual has a single parent and a single child. Individuals, within as well as across generations,
are identical in their preferences and innate abilities. They may diﬀer, however, in their family
wealth and thus, due to borrowing constraints, in their capability to ﬁnance investment in human
capital in the absence of public education.
Individuals live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of their lives individuals devote their
entire time for the acquisition of human capital. The acquired level of human capital increases if
their time investment is supplemented with capital investment in education. In the second period
of their lives, individuals supply their eﬃciency units of labor and allocate the resulting wage
income, along with their interest income, between consumption and transfers to their children.
An individual i born in period t (a member i of generation t) receives a parental transfer, bi
t,
in the ﬁrst period of life. A fraction τt ≥ 0 of this capital transfer is collected by the government
in order to ﬁnance public education, whereas a fraction 1 − τt is saved for future consumption.
Individuals devote their ﬁrst period for the acquisition of human capital. Education is provided
publicly free of charge.29 The acquired level of human capital increases with the real resources
invested in public education. The number of eﬃciency units of labor of each member of generation
t in period t +1 ,ht+1, is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the government real
expenditure on education per member of generation t, et.30
ht+1 = h(et), (3)
29As will become apparent, once the level of public education is chosen, individuals have no incentive to acquire
private education. In particular, in early stages of development, when the tax rate τt equals zero, individuals do not
acquire education.
30A more realistic formulation would link the cost of education to (teacher’s) wages, which may vary in the process
of development. For instance, ht+1 = h(et/wt) implies that the cost of education is a function of the number of
eﬃciency units of teachers that are used in the education of each individual i. As can be derived from section 2.4,
under both formulations the optimal expenditure on education, et, is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio
in the economy, and the qualitative results are therefore identical.
17where h(0) = 1,h 0(0) = γ < ∞, and limet→∞ h0(et)=0 . The assumption that the slope of
the production function of human capital is ﬁnite at the origin along with the assumption that
each individual has a minimal level of human capital, h(0) > 0, even in the absence of a real
expenditure on education, assure that under some market conditions investment in human capital
is not optimal.31
In the second period life, a member i of generation t supplies the acquired eﬃciency units
of labor, ht+1, at the competitive market wage, wt+1. In addition, the individual receives the gross
return on savings, (1 − τt)bi
tRt+1. The individual’s second period income, Ii
t+1, is therefore
Ii
t+1 = wt+1h(et)+( 1− τt)bi
tRt+1, (4)
where due to complete capital depreciation Rt+1 ≡ rt+1 ≡ R(kt+1).
Preferences of a member i of generation t are deﬁned over second period consumption, ci
t+1,
and the transfer to their oﬀspring, bi
t+1.32 They are represented by a non-homothetic, log-linear
utility function that generates the property that the average propensity to bequest is an increasing
function of wealth:33
ui
t =( 1− β)logci
t+1 + β log(θ + bi
t+1), (5)
where β ∈ (0,1) and θ > 0.34
Hence, a member i of generation t allocates second period income between consumption,
ci
t+1, and transfers to the oﬀspring, bi





31These assumptions are necessary in order to assure that in the early stage of development the sole engine of
growth is physical capital accumulation and there is no incentive to invest in human capital. It permits, therefore,
a sharp presentation of the results regarding institutional transition. The typically assumed Inada condition (i.e., γ
is inﬁnite) is designed to simplify the exposition by avoiding a corner solution, but it is not a realistic assumption.
32For simplicity we abstract from ﬁrst period consumption. It may be viewed as part of the consumption of the
parent.
33This utility function represent preferences under which the saving rate is an increasing function of wealth. This
classical feature (e.g., Keynes (1920), Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1957)) is consistent with empirical evidence. Dynan,
Skinner and Zeldes (2000) ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between personal saving rates and lifetime income in the
United States. They argue that their ﬁndings are consistent with models in which precautionary saving and bequest
motives drive variations in saving rates across income groups. Furthermore, Tomes (1981) and Menchik and David
(1983) ﬁnd evidence that the marginal propensity to bequeath increases with wealth. The choice of a non-homothetic
utility function is necessary to assure that Workers do not invest in physical capital prior to the establishment of
p u b l i cs c h o o l i n g—af e a t u r et h a th a sn oq u a l i t a t i v eb e a r i n g ,b u ts h a r p e n st h ep r e s e n t a t i o no ft h er e s u l t s .Ac h o i c e
of a homothetic utility function would not aﬀect the results regarding the eﬀect of capital skill-complementarity on
institutional transition, but it would imply that the demise of the class structure would have necessarily occurred
even in the absence of education reforms. Nevertheless, even under homothetic preferences, educational reforms
would have a signiﬁcant role in expediting the process.
34This form of altruistic bequest motive (i.e., the “joy of giving”) is the common form in the recent literature on
income distribution and growth. It is supported empirically by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997). Utility from
after tax transfers would reduce intergenerational transfers but would not aﬀect the qualitative results. In particular,











t+1 − θ/(1 − τt+1)) if I
i
t+1 > θ/(1 − τt+1);
0 if I
i
t+1 ≤ θ/(1 − τt+1),
18The individual chooses the level of second period consumption, ci
t+1, and a non-negative transfer
to the oﬀspring, bi
t+1, so as to maximize the utility function subject to the second period budget
constraint (6).35













where θ ≡ θ(1 − β)/β.
3.3 Physical Capital, Human Capital, and Output
This section demonstrates that the stocks of physical and human capital and therefore the level of
output are determined by the aggregate level of inter g e n e r a t i o n a lt r a n s f e r s ,t h el e v e lo ft a x a t i o n ,
and governmental expenditure on public education, in the preceding period.
Let Bt denote the aggregate level of intergenerational transfers in period t.Af r a c t i o nτt of
this capital transfer is collected by the government in order to ﬁnance public education, whereas
af r a c t i o n1− τt is saved for future consumption.36 The capital stock in period t +1 , Kt+1, is
therefore
Kt+1 =( 1− τt)Bt, (8)
whereas the government tax revenues are τtBt.
Since population is normalized to 1, the education expenditure per young individual in
period t, et,i s
et = τtBt, (9)
and the stock of human capital in period t +1 , Ht+1, is therefore
Ht+1 = h(et)=h(τtBt). (10)




≡ k(τt,B t), (11)
35It should be noted that the transfer, b
i
t+1, is necessarily non-negative due to the assumption that the oﬀspring
has no income in the ﬁrst period of life.
36As will become apparent, this linear tax structure is the simplest structure that would generate the transition
from a class society. It assures that the chosen level of taxation is independent of the structure of the political system.
That is, independent of the distribution of political power or voting rights among members of society. Furthermore,
Capitalists could have not eﬀectively forced the poor to ﬁnance their own education due to the proximity of the
income of the poor to the subsistence level of consumption and the positive eﬀect of income of the outcome of the
education process.
19where k(0,B t)=Bt, ∂k(τt,B t)/∂τt < 0, and ∂k(τt,B t)/∂Bt > 0, and the output per-worker in
period t +1i s
yt+1 = A[(1 − τt)Bt]αh(τtBt)
1−α ≡ y(τt,B t). (12)
3.4 Optimal Taxation
This section derives the optimal tax rate and therefore the optimal expenditure on education from
the viewpoint of each individual in society. It demonstrates that as long as taxation is used in
order to ﬁnance public schooling, there is a consensus in society regarding the desirable tax rate.
If the government would be engaged in direct transfers from the rich to the poor in addition to
the provision of public schooling, then a conﬂict would emerge between the classes regarding the
desirable tax rate. This would perhaps add some realism to but would obscure unnecessarily the
focus on the role of cooperative forces in the demise of the class structure.
Given that the indirect utility function is a strictly increasing function of the individual’s
second period wealth, the optimal tax rate, τi
t, from the viewpoint of member i of generation t,
(and hence the optimal expenditure on education, et = τi
tBt from the viewpoint of this individual,
given Bt) would maximize the individual’s second period wealth, Ii
t+1.
τi




where wt+1 = w(kt+1)a n dRt+1 = R(kt+1).
As follow from (13), noting (2) and (11) the optimal tax rate from the viewpoint of a member
i of generation t, τi




w(kt+1)γ ≤ R(kt+1) for τi
t =0 ,
(14)
where kt+1 = k(τt,B t). Hence, given Bt, τi
t is determined independently of bi
t, and is therefore
identical for all i.38 That is τi
t = τ∗
t for all i. Furthermore, there exists a unique capital-labor ratio
e k, below which τi
t =0 . That is, R(e k)=w(e k)γ.
37Substituting (2) and (11) into (13),
τ
i







α[1 − α + αb
i
t/Bt].
The conditions in (14) follow from the optimization problem above, using (2).
38The unanimous agreement on the tax rate is a result of the linear tax rate and the unit elasticity of substitution
between human and physical capital in production. Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the shares of
labor and capital are constant and wage and capital income are therefore maximized if output is maximized. If the
elasticity of substitution would be larger than unity, then the poor would prefer higher taxes, whereas if the elasticity
of substitution is smaller than unity, then the rich would prefer higher taxes.
20Lemma 1 (a) The optimal tax rate in period t, τ∗
t, from the viewpoint of each member of gener-






> 0 for Bt > e k
=0 for Bt ≤ e k;
e k = α/(1 − α)γ.
(b) The optimal expenditure on public education, et = τ(Bt)Bt ≡ e(Bt) from the viewpoint
of each member of generation t is strictly increasing for Bt > e k.
Proof. Noting (2), (11) and (14) it follows from the properties of h(τtBt)t h a tτ∗
t is uniquely
determined by Bt and e0(Bt) > 0, where as follows from the deﬁnition of e k and (2), e k = α/(1−α)γ.
¤
Hence, since the optimal tax rate in period t is identical from the viewpoint of each member
of generation t, it follows that under any political structure, the chosen tax rate in period t is
τt = τ∗
t = τ(Bt). (15)





> 0 for kt+1 > e k
=0 for kt+1 ≤ e k.
Proof. Since h(0) = 1, it follows from (11) (14) and Lemma 1 that kt+1 = Bt for Bt ≤ e k and
hence for kt+1 ≤ e k. Thus the Proposition follows. ¤
Corollary 1 The chosen level of taxation in every period maximizes output per-worker in the
following period. That is,
τt =a r gm a xyt+1 ≡ argmaxy(τt,B t).
Proof. Maximizing y(τt,B t) with respect to τt yield the optimality conditions given by
(14). That is, the optimality conditions for the desired level of taxation from the viewpoint of each
individual. ¤
Hence, as long as the rate of return to human capital is lower than the rate of return on
physical capital (i.e., as long as kt+1 ≤ e k) the chosen level of investment in public education is zero
— the level of investment that maximizes output per-worker. Once the rate of return to human
capital equals the rate of return on physical capital (i.e., once kt+1 > e k)t h ec h o s e ni n v e s t m e n ti n
public education is positive and it maximizes output per-worker.
213.5 The Dynamical System
This section derives the properties of the dynamical system that governs the evolution of the
economy in the transition from a class society to a classless society. It demonstrates that the
evolution of the economy is fully determined by the evolution of intergenerational transfer within
classes in society.
Suppose that in period 0 the economy consists of two groups of individuals in their ﬁrst
period of their lives - Capitalists and workers. They are identical in their preferences and diﬀer
only in their initial wealth. The Capitalists, denoted by R (Rich), are a fraction λ of all individuals
in society, who equally own the entire initial stock of wealth. The Workers, denoted by P (Poor),
are a fraction 1 − λ of all individuals in society, who have no ownership over the initial physical
capital stock.39 Since individuals are initially homogenous within a group, the uniqueness of the
solution to their optimization problem assures that their oﬀspring who acquire the same level of
education and are taxed equally are homogenous as well . Hence, in every period a fraction λ of
all adults are homogenous descendents of the Capitalists, denoted by members of group R, and a
fraction 1 − λ are homogenous descendents of Workers, denoted by members of group P.
The optimization of groups P and R of generation t − 1i np e r i o dt>0, determines the
aggregate intergenerational transfers in period t, Bt.
Bt = λbR





t is the intergenerational transfer of individual i in period t; i = P,R.







where as follows from (2) and (14), ∂κ/∂bi
t > 0,i= R,P. Furthermore, κ(0,0) = 0 (since in the
absence of transfers and hence savings the capital stock in the subsequent period is zero).
Since members of group R equally own the entire initial s t o c ko fw e a l t hi np e r i o d0a n d
members of group P have no ownership over the initial stock of wealth, it follows that bR
0 > 0a n d
b
p
0 =0 . Furthermore, it is assumed that
bR
0 < e k/λ. (A1)
As established in Lemma 2, and consistently with empirical evidence about the process of
development, this assumption assures that in early stages of development there is no investment
in public education.
39As will become apparent this class distinction will dissipate over time. In particular, descendents of the working
class will ultimately own some physical capital.
22Lemma 2 Under A1, k1 < e k.
Proof. Since b
p
0 =0 , (11),(16) and Lemma 1, given the properties of (3), imply that
k1 = B0 = λbR
0 . Hence it follows from Assumption A1 that k1 < e k. ¤
The evolution of transfers within each group i = R,P, a sf o l l o w sf r o m( 7 ) ,i sg i v e nb y
bi
t+1 =m a x {β[w(kt+1)h(τ(Bt)Bt)) + (1 − τ(Bt))bi
tR(kt+1) − θ],0}; i = R,P. (18)
The evolution of transfers within each of the two groups, as follows from the fact that kt+1 =
κ(bR
t ,b P
t ), and Bt = B(bR
t ,b P
t ) is fully determined by the evolution of transfers within both types
of dynasties. Namely, the dynamical
system is uniquely determined by the joint-evolution of the intergenerational transfers of
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4 The Process of Development
This section analyzes the endogenous demise of the Capitalists-Workers class structure as the
economy evolves from early to mature stages of development. As will become apparent, if additional
plausible restrictions are imposed on the basic model, the economy endogenously evolves through
two fundamental regimes:
• Regime I: This early stage of development, is characterized by a stable class structure. Cap-
italists generate a higher rate of return from a direct investment in physical capital, rather
than from supporting the education of Workers that would complement their capital in the
production process. Capitalists therefore have no incentive to ﬁnancially support the educa-
tion of the Workers.
• Regime II: These later stages of development are characterized by the onset of the grad-
ual demise of the Capitalists-Workers class structure. The importance of human capital in
sustaining the proﬁts of Capitalists increases suﬃciently. The Capitalists ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to ﬁnancially support public education, and ultimately Workers, as well as Capitalists, are
engaged in physical capital accumulation.
234.1 Regime I: Physical Capital Accumulation
This early stage of development is characterized by a stable class structure. Capitalists generate a
higher rate of return from a direct investment in physical capital, rather than from supporting the
education of Workers that would complement their capital in the production process. Capitalists
therefore have no incentive to ﬁnancially support the education of the Workers.
Regime I is deﬁned as the time interval 0 ≤ t<e t,w h e r ee t +1i st h eﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c h
the capital labor ratio exceeds e k (i.e., e t is the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c hi n v e s t m e n ti nh u m a nc a p i t a l
takes place). In this early stage of development the capital-labor ratio in period t +1 ,kt+1,
which determines the investment in public education in period t, is lower than e k. As follows from
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, the tax rate is zero, there is no public education, and both groups
of individuals acquire only basic skills. That is, Ht+1 = h(0) = 1.
Let ˇ k be the level of the capital-labor ratio such that w(ˇ k)=θ. As follows from (4), ˇ k is the
critical level of the capital-labor ratio in time t+1 below which in the absence of public investment
in education in period t individuals who do not receive transfers from their parents in period t do
not transfer income to their oﬀspring in period t +1 . T h a ti s , Ii
t+1 ≤ θ and therefore bi
t+1 =0 .
In order to assure that investment in human capital will begin in a period where the poor
do not invest in physical capital, it is assumed therefore that40
e k ≤ ˇ k. (A2)
As follows from (2), ˇ k =[ θ/(1 − α)A]
1/α.S i n c e e k = α/(1−α)γ, Assumption A2 implies therefore
that γ > (αα(1 − α)1−αA/θ)1/α.
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions A1 and A2, there are no intergenerational transfers among workers
(i.e., bP
t =0 )as long as public education is not established, i.e.,
bP
t =0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ e t
Proof. As follows from Proposition 1, the deﬁnition of e t, and Assumption A1 that assures
that e t>1, for 0 ≤ t<e t, there is no investment in public education and hence ht+1 =1 .
Hence, since Assumption A2 implies that kt ≤ ˇ k and therefore w(kt) ≤ θ, it follows that bP
t+1 =
max[β[w(kt+1)−θ] ,0] = 0 if bP
t =0 . Since bP
0 = 0 it follows therefore that bP
t =0f o r1≤ t ≤ e t. ¤
The capital-labor ratio in period t+1, as follows from (16), (17), proposition 1, and Lemma
3, is
kt+1 = κ(bR
t ,0) = λbR
t for t ∈ [0,e t) (20)
40This assumption is designed to simplify the presentation of the results. As will become apparent, even if
Assumption A2 would be violated, the Capitalists would have an incentive to support the education of Workers.
24and the level of output per-worker in period t +1 ,yt+1, as follows from (1) and (20), is41
yt+1 = A[λbR
t ]α for t ∈ [0,e t). (21)
The Dynamics of Output Per-Worker
The evolution of output per-worker in Regime I is driven in this regime by physical capital
accumulation. The income of the Workers is not suﬃciently high to permit intergenerational
transfers and therefore savings, and the evolution of intergenerational transfers among Capitalists
determines therefore the accumulation of physical capital and thus the growth of output per-worker
over Regime I.
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for t∈ [0,e t) (22)
where bR
0 > 0 is given. Hence in Regime I the dynamical system is fully determined by the evolution
of transfers across members of group R.
Hence, the evolution of the entire dynamical system in Regime I can be represented by
the evolution of output per-worker. Since the aggregate income of the Capitalists (group R)i s
(λ(1−α)+α)yt, (where α is the share of capital in total output that is fully owned by the Capitalists
and λ(1 − α) is the labor share
of group R), it follows from (7), (21) and (22) that the evolution of output per-worker in
t h et i m ep e r i o dt ∈ [0,e t)i s
yt+1 =m a x[ A{β{[λ(1 − α)+α]yt − λθ}}
α,0] ≡ φI(yt),f o ry t ∈ [0, e y), (23)
where e y = Ae kα.
In order to assure that the economy would ultimately take oﬀ from Regime I to Regime
II (i.e., in order to assure that consistently with empirical evidence the process of development is
marked by human capital accumulation) it is assumed that the technology is suﬃciently productive.
That is,
A> e A (A3)
where e A is the critical level of technology such that φI(e y)=e y.42
41Note that since the size of the population is 1, Yt+1 = yt+1.
42As follows from (23), e A =[ 1+λ(1−α)
αβγ
αθα
−α]/[β(α+(1−α)λ)]. It should be noted that a suﬃciently high
level of A that satisﬁes Assumption A3 does not violate Assumption A2. An increase in A and γ
α holding their
ratio unchanged, does not aﬀect A2 and increases A relative to e A.
25Figure 4 depicts the properties of φI(yt) over the interval yt ∈ (0, e y], as established in the
following Lemma and Corollary..
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions A2 and A3, there exists y ∈ (0, e y); e y = Ae kα, such that the proper-
ties of φI(yt) in the interval yt ∈ [0, e y] are
φI(yt)=0 for yt ≤ y
∂φI(yt)/∂yt > 0 for y <y t ≤ e y
∂2φI(yt)/∂[yt]2 < 0 for y <y t ≤ e y
φI(yt) >y t for yt = e y
Proof. As follows from (23), φI(yt)=0f o ryt ≤ y = λθ/(λ(1 − α)+α), and ∂φI(yt)/∂yt > 0,
and ∂2φI(yt)/∂[yt]2 < 0f o ry <y t ≤ e y = A{α/[(1 − α)γ]}α. Consistently with Assumption A2,
there exist a suﬃciently small γ such that e y>y .43 Furthermore, Assumption A3 assures that
φI(yt) >y t for yt = e y ¤
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions A2 and A3, the dynamical system φI(yt) has two steady-state
equilibria in the interval yt ∈ [0, e y]; A locally stable steady-state, y =0 , and an unstable steady-
state, yu ∈ (y, e y).
The dynamical system φI(yt) has two steady-state equilibria in the interval yt ∈ [0, e y]; A
locally stable steady-state, y =0 , and an unstable steady-state, yu ∈ (y, e y). If yt < yu then output
per worker contract over time and the system converges to the steady-state equilibrium y =0 . If
yt > yu then output per worker expand over the entire interval (yu, e y], crossing into Regime II.
Hence, in order to assure that the process of development takes oﬀ it is assumed that
y0 ∈ (yu, e y). (A4)
implying that bR
0 ∈ ([yu/Aλα]1/α,[e y/Aλα]1/α)=( [ yu/Aλα]1/α,e k/λ). Hence, Assumption A1 is a
subset of Assumption A4.
The accumulation of physical capital by the Capitalists in Regime I raises gradually the
potential role of the education of the Workers in sustaining the proﬁt rates of the Capitalists.
Ultimately, the Capitalists ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to support public education, and the economy enters
into Regime II where the process of development is fueled by human capital accumulation as well
as physical capital accumulation.
43If γ < γ < γ where γ =[ α
α(1−α)
1−αA/θ]






tion A2 and e y>yare satisﬁed simultaneously. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous footnote, Assumptions A3
and e y>yare mutually consistent.
264.2 Regime II: Education and Decline of the Class Structure
These later stages of development are characterized by the onset of the gradual demise of the
Capitalists-Workers class structure. The importance of human capital in sustaining the proﬁts
of Capitalists increases suﬃciently. The Capitalists ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to ﬁnancially support public
education, and ultimately Workers, as well as Capitalists, are engaged in physical capital accumu-
lation.
4.2.1 Stage I: The Birth of Public Schooling
In Stage I of Regime II, the economy witnesses the birth of public education. The Capitalists
invest in human capital as well as in physical capital, whereas workers acquire education ﬁnanced
by the Capitalists. The wage income, however, is not suﬃciently high so as to permit physical
capital accumulation by the Workers.
S t a g eIo fR e g i m eI Ii sd e ﬁned as the time interval e t ≤ t<b t, where b t is the ﬁr s tt i m ep e r i o d
in which Workers (group P) are engaged in intergenerational transfers, permitting physical capital
accumulation by the oﬀspring. Although workers acquire education ﬁnanced by the Capitalists,
their income level is not suﬃciently high so as to permit transfer to their oﬀspring.








for t ∈ [e t,b t). (24)
where ∂κ(bR
t ,0)/∂bR
t > 0. The level of output per-worker in period t +1 ,yt+1, as follows from (1)
and (24), is
yt+1 = A[(1 − τt)λbR
t ]α[h(τtλbR
t )]1−α for t ∈ [e t,b t). (25)
The Dynamics of Output Per-Worker
The evolution of output per-worker in Stage I of Regime II is driven by the accumulation
of human capital as well as physical capital. The income of the Workers is still not suﬃciently
high to permit intergenerational transfers. Intergenerational transfers among the Capitalists are
the sole source of physical capital accumulation, as well as of governmental expenditure on public
education, and they determine therefore the growth of output per-worker over Stage I of Regime
II.
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for t∈ [e t,b t), (26)
where kt+1 = κ(bR
t ,0).
27Hence, the evolution of the entire dynamical system in Stage I of Regime II can be represented
by the evolution of output per-worker. Since the aggregate income of the Capitalists (group R)i s
(λ(1−α)+α)yt, as is the case in Regime I, it follows from (7) (21) and (26) that the evolution of
output per-worker in the time period t ∈ [e t,b t)i s ,
yt+1 = A{(1 − τt)β{[λ(1 − α)+α]yt − λθ}}α{h(τtβ{[λ(1 − α)+α]yt − λθ})}1−α
≡ φII(yt) for yt ∈ [e y,b y),
(27)
where e y = Ae kα, τt =a r gm a xφII(yt), and b y = θ/(1 − α), is the critical level of the output per-
worker such that the income level of individuals who do not receive transfer from their parents
(i.e., members of group P)e q u a l sθ. A sf o l l o w sf r o m( 4 ) ,a sl o n ga syt < b y, the Workers (members
of group P) do not transfer income to their oﬀspring. Hence, since e y = A{α/[(1−α)γ]}α, it follows
from assumption A2 that b y>e y.
In order to assure that the economy would ultimately take oﬀ from Stage I to Stage II within
Regime II it is assumed that the technology is suﬃciently productive. That is,
A ≥ b A ≡ 1/βα (A5)
where as follows from (27) and Corollary 1, b A is a suﬃciently high level of technology such that
φII(b y) > b y.44
If Assumption A5 is violated then there are two feasible scenarios. The economy may
converge to a steady-state equilibrium in the interval (e y,b y) with public education, where individuals
are identical in their level of human capital and in their wage income, but they diﬀer in their
level of wealth. Alternatively, the economy may proceed, nevertheless, to a long-run steady-state
equilibrium above b y, where oﬀspring of the Capitalists and the Workers are indistinguishable.
Figure 4 depicts the properties of φII(yt) over the interval yt ∈ [e y,b y], a sd e r i v e di nt h e
following Lemma and Corollary.





Proof. Follows from (27), Assumptions A2 and A5, and the concavity of h(e), noting that
τt =a r gm a xyt+1. ¤
Corollary 3 The dynamical system φII(yt) has no steady-state equilibria in the interval yt ∈ [e y,b y].




28The dynamical system φII(yt) has no steady-state equilibria in the interval yt ∈ [e y,b y]a n d
the transfers within each dynasty of type R expand over the entire interval crossing into Stage II.
Hence, in stage I of Regime II, the economy witnesses the birth of public education. The
Capitalists invest in physical capital, and workers as well as the Capitalists acquire education
ﬁnanced by the Capitalists. The wage income, however, is not suﬃciently high so as to permit
physical capital accumulation by the Workers. During Stage I of Regime II, the accumulation
of physical and human capital increases wage income further, and ultimately the economy enters
Stage II of Regime II in which the wage income is suﬃciently high so as to permit the accumulation
of physical capital by the Workers.
4.2.2 Stage II: The Demise of the Class Society
The accumulation of physical and human capital during Stage I of Regime II, increases wage
income further and ultimately, the economy enters Stage II of Regime II in which the wage income
is suﬃciently high so as to permit the accumulation of physical capital by the Workers.
Stage II of Regime II is deﬁned as t ≥ b t. In this time interval all individuals acquire education
and transfer income to their oﬀspring.
The level of output per-worker in stage II of Regime II, as established in Appendix 2, exceeds
b y and the wage income of members of all individuals exceeds θ. Hence, it follows from (16) and
(7), that
Bt = λbR
t +( 1− λ)bP
t = β[yt − θ]. (28)
The capital-labor ratio in period t +1 , as follows from (11) and (28), is therefore
kt+1 =
(1 − τt)β[yt − θ]
h(τtβ[yt − θ])
for t ∈ [b t,∞). (29)
and the level of output per-worker in period t +1 ,yt+1, as follows from (1) and (29), is
yt+1 = A[(1 − τt)β[yt − θ]]α[h(τtβ[yt − θ])]1−α for yt > b y. (30)
The Evolution of Output Per-Worker
The evolution of output per-worker in Stage II of Regime II is driven by the accumulation of
human capital as well as physical capital. The income of the Workers is suﬃciently high to permit
intergenerational transfers and the Workers as well as the Capitalists contribute to physical capital
accumulation and governmental expenditure on public education, and they determine therefore the
growth of output per-worker over Stage II of Regime II.
The evolution of output per worker in Stage II of Regime II is independent of the distribution
of intergenerational transfers across classes and hence the evolution of the economy can be fully
29characterized by the evolution of output per-worker. As follows from (1) and (29), the evolution
of output per worker over the time interval t>b t is
yt+1 = A[(1 − τt)β[yt − θ]]α[h(τtβ[yt − θ])]1−α ≡ φIII(yt)f o ryt > b y. (31)
where τt =a r g m a x φIII(yt), and therefore ∂φIII(yt)/∂yt > 0. Furthermore, it follows from
the concavity and the boundary conditions of h(e) and the aggregate production function that
∂2φIII(yt)/∂y2
t < 0, and limyt→∞ ∂φIII(yt)/∂yt =0 .
Corollary 4 Under A2-A5, output per worker yt increases monotonically in Stage II of Regime
II and converges to a steady-state equilibrium y>b y.
Proof. Follows directly from the properties of φIII(yt). ¤
Proposition 2 Under A2-A5, the economy converges to a steady-state equilibrium in which the
income gap between the oﬀspring of the Capitalists and the Workers is eliminated.
Proof. As follows from the properties of (9),(15),(28),(29) and Corollary 4, the economy converges
to a unique steady-state vector (y, k,τ,h). Since
bi
t+1 = β[w(kt+1)ht+1 +( 1− τt)bi
tR(kt+1) − θ] for t>b t ,i = P.R (32)











∂ζ(bi,k)/∂bi ≥ 0) either [bi decreases (increases) for all i and thus k decreases (increases)] or
[bR increases indeﬁnitely and bP decreases to zero, and thus k increases] in contradiction to the












). Since bP > 0, the
steady-state equilibrium is (bR,b P) >> 0, where bP = bR since ζ is independent of i = P,R. ¤
Hence, in stage II of Regime II the economy witnesses the demise of the class society. The
descendents of Workers as well as Capitalists acquire human capital as well as physical capital,
the income gap between the classes narrows and vanishes in the long-run, and class characteristics
fade.
4.3 Analysis
In Regime I, physical capital is scarce, the contribution of human capital to the production process
does not justify investment in human capital, and the process of development is fueled by capital
30accumulation. The wage rate is lower than the critical level that would enable individuals who
do not own any capital to engage in intergenerational transfers (and thus savings). Workers,
therefore, consume their entire wages; they are not engaged in saving, capital accumulation, and
intergenerational transfers. Their descendents, therefore, are also unable to engage in saving and
intergenerational transfers and Workers are in a temporary steady-state equilibrium in which there
is no investment in either physical or human capital. In contrast, the income of the Capitalists,
who own the entire stock of capital in the economy, is suﬃciently high, permitting intergenerational
transfers and capital accumulation. Intergenerational transfers among the Capitalists increase over
time and the stock of physical capital in the economy, therefore, increases as well. During this
regime, physical capital accumulation by the Capitalists decreases the return to physical capital and
the importance of potential human capital formation in sustaining the return to capital increases.
However, as long as the Capitalists generate a higher rate of return from a direct investment in
physical capital, rather than from supporting the education of Workers, which would complement
their capital in the production process, the qualitative structure of the economy remains unchanged.
The Workers remains in a poverty trap, the Capitalists get richer, and the process of development
is based solely on physical capital accumulation.
The accumulation of physical capital by the Capitalists in Regime I gradually raises the
potential role of the education of the Workers in sustaining the proﬁt rates of the Capitalists.
Ultimately, the Capitalists ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to support public education, and the economy en-
ters Regime II where the process of development is fueled by human as well as physical capital
accumulation.
Regime II is subdivided into two stages. In stage I of Regime II, the economy witnesses
the birth of public education. The Capitalists invest in physical capital, and workers, as well as
the Capitalists acquire education ﬁnanced by the Capitalists. The wage income, however, is not
high enough to permit physical capital accumulation by the Workers. During Stage I of Regime
II, the accumulation of physical and human capital increases wage income further, and ultimately
the economy enters Stage II of Regime II in which the wage income is high enough to permit the
accumulation of physical capital by the Workers.
In stage II of Regime II the economy witnesses the demise of the class society. The de-
scendents of Workers as well as Capitalists acquire human capital as well as physical capital, the
income gap between the classes narrows, vanishing in the long-run, and class characteristics fade.
315 Evidence from the Balfour Act — UK 1902
The basic premise of this research, regarding the positive attitude of the capitalists towards educa-
tion reforms, is examined based on the voting patterns on the Balfour Act of 1902 — the proposed
education reform in the UK that marked the consolidation of a national education system and the
creation of a publicly supported secondary school system. In light of the proposed theory, one
would expect that variations in the support of MPs for the Balfour Act would reﬂect the variations
in the skill intensity in the counties they represent. Higher support for the Balfour Act would be
expected from MPs who represent industrial skill-intensive counties.
We construct a data set gathered from a variety of historical sources on the third (and ﬁnal)
vote on the Balfour act.45 The data, as described in detail in the Appendix, combines the home
district and party aﬃliation for each MP with his voting record on the Balfour Act. In addition,
the data includes county level data on the percentage of employment in skill-intensive industries,
income per capita, degree of urbanization, and religious aﬃliation.
As is apparent from Table 1, which summarizes the voting patterns on the Balfour Act
a c c o r d i n gt op a r t ya ﬃliation, Conservatives and Unionists were predominantly supportive of the
Balfour Act while Liberals were predominantly opposed. Nevertheless, variations in the voting
patterns within each of the parties due to a signiﬁcant number of abstentions, is suﬃcient for a
signiﬁcant identiﬁcation.
We perform ordered probit regressions to examine the eﬀect of percent employment in in-
dustrial skill-intensive sectors in each MP’s county on the voting patterns on the Balfour Act. As
documented in Table 2, there exists a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of percent employment in industrial
skill-intensive sectors in a county on the propensity of their MPs to vote in favor of the education
reform proposed by the Balfour Act of 1902.
Regression (1) in Table 2 examines the eﬀect of the employment in industrial skill-intensive
sectors in each MP’s county on the voting patterns on the Balfour Act, controlling for county’s
per-capita income. Consistent with the main hypothesis of this research, the regression shows a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the ratio of employment in industrial skill-intensive sectors in each
MP’s county on the propensity to vote for the proposed education reform.
The proposed Balfour Act of 1902 provided a role for the Anglican Church in the provision
of education. As a result the non-conformists objected to the Act. In Regression (2), therefore,
45In previous education acts, the third and ﬁnal vote was conducted by voice, and no record exists of the distribution
of votes across MPs. Some records of votes on various amendments for these education bills do exist, but it is not
possible to specify clearly which of the votes were crucial or even whether an aﬃrmative vote is actually in support
of the ultimate education bill.
32we control for the percentage of non-conformists in each county. The regression indeed shows a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the fraction of non-conformists in the county on the support for the
Act by the MPs representing that county. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of the ratio of employment in
industrial skill-intensive sectors on the vote remains signiﬁcantly positive.
In Regression (3) we add dummy variables to control for counties in Scotland and Wales.
Scotland and Wales tended to view themselves as independent nations within the UK. This may
have led them to vote systematically for or against certain measures based solely on nationalistic
grounds (e.g., being against universal education because it imposes “English” education). Since
counties in Scotland and Wales were characterized by lower income, a higher fraction of Catholics, a
smaller urban sector, and a smaller skill-intensive industrial sector, relative to England, excluding
these controls might cause omitted variable biases in the other coeﬃcient estimates. However,
despite the incorporation of the Scotland and Wales dummies, the eﬀect of the ratio of employment
in industrial skill-intensive sectors on the vote remains signiﬁcantly positive.
In Regression (4) we control for party aﬃliation. As is apparent from Table 1, there is a
strong correlation between party aﬃliation and voting patterns: Conservatives and Unionists were
predominantly supportive of the Balfour Act while Liberals were predominantly opposed. Indeed,
the regression shows that aﬃliation with the Liberal party has a highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on support for the Balfour Act, and aﬃliation with the Conservative party therefore has a highly
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on support for the Act. Nevertheless, the eﬀe c to ft h er a t i oo fe m p l o y m e n t
in industrial skill-intensive sectors on the vote remains signiﬁcantly positive. Further, as established
in Table 3, the ratio of employment in industrial skill-intensive sectors has a signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect on support for the Conservative party, which, in turn, supports the education act.
Finally, in Regression (5) of Table 2, we control for the percentage of the urban population
within each county. This is an attempt to separate between demand for education that stems
from skill-intensive industrial development, and other sources of demand for education in an urban
environment. In particular, support for public education may reﬂe c tt h ed e s i r et or e d u c ec r i m e ,
which is prevalent in an urban environment.46. Interestingly, urbanization has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on support for the education act and the eﬀect of the weight of the skill-intensive industrial sector
remains signiﬁcantly positive.
Table 3 reports the results of probit regressions of the eﬀect of the ratio of employment in
the skill-intensive industrial sector in each MP’s county on party aﬃliation, controlling for the
percentage of employment in skill-intensive industries, per-capita income, degree of urbanization,
46Unfortunately, direct crime statistics at the county level are unavailable for this period.
33and religious aﬃliation in each county, and incorporating the Scotland and Wales dummies. It
shows that the ratio of employment in the skill-intensive industrial sector in each MP’s county has
as i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀect on aﬃliation with the Conservative party.47
Hence, it is apparent from Tables 2 and 3 that the ratio of employment in the skill-intensive
industrial sector has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the vote on the Balfour Act through two
channels. The ﬁrst is the direct channel, holding party constant. The second is through its
inﬂuence on the MP’s party itself.48
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper hypothesizes that the demise of the class structure that existed in Europe in the 19th
century reﬂects a deliberate transformation of society orchestrated by the capitalists. In contrast to
the prevailing wisdom, the research suggests that the transition from the European class structure
of the 19th century may be viewed as the outcome of an optimal reaction of the capitalists to
the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their proﬁt rates. The paper argues
that the process of capital accumulation gradually intensiﬁed the relative scarcity of skilled labor
and generated an incentive for human capital accumulation. Due to the complementarity between
physical and human capital in production, the capitalists were among the prime beneﬁciaries of
the potential accumulation of human capital by the masses. They therefore had the incentive to
support the provision of public education that would improve their economic well-being, although
it would ultimately undermine their dynasty’s position on the social ladder and would lead to the
demise of the class structure. The basic premise of this research, regarding the positive attitude
of capitalists towards education reforms, is supported empirically by a newly constructed data set
on the voting patterns on England’s education reform proposed in the Balfour Act of 1902.
Unlike the conventional wisdom, the paper argues that the demise of the capitalists-workers
class structure was an outcome of a cooperative, rather than divisive process. The political reforms
that accompanied education reforms can be viewed as an attempt by the capitalists to broaden
the coalition that supports public vocational (utilitarian) education, against the wishes of the
clergy and the landlords for whom human capital was less complementary in production,49 or as a
47Adjusting the probit results to obtain marginal eﬀects, we ﬁnd that a one percentage point increase in the ratio
of employment in the industrial sector raises the probability of belonging to the Liberal party by approximately 1.7
percentage points.
48It should be noted that the voting patterns of the industrial-intensive counties on alternative bills in the same year
diﬀered signiﬁcantly. In particular, the share of employment in the industrial sector is an insigniﬁcant explanatory
variable for the 1902 vote on an income tax bill using an ordered probit with the same set of controls. This result
suggests that representatives from industrial-intensive counties do not vote uniformly on each bill.
49Cultural diﬀerences across societies may have resulted in the failure of some societies to adopt eﬃcient institutions
34by-product of the educational reforms that made political inequality harder to sustain or justify.
One may argue that political reforms during the 19th century shifted the balance of power
towards the working class and enabled workers to implement education reforms against the will of
the capitalists. The evidence, however, does not support this alternative hypothesis. Education
reforms took place in autocratic states that did not relinquish political power throughout the 19th
century, and major reforms occurred in societies in the midst of the process of democratization
well before the stage in which the working class constituted the majority among the voters.
(e.g., Greif (1994)). Therefore, the timing of education reforms relative to the process of development may diﬀer
across countries.
35Data Appendix
Vote on the Balfour Act — The voting record of each MP on the Balfour Act is gathered from
the supplement to the British Parliamentary Papers, the Division Lists. The record speciﬁes who
voted in favor of and who voted against the bill.50 The list of the names and home districts of each
of the British MPs during the vote on the Balfour Act is collected from The British Parliamentary
Papers. Party aﬃliation for each MP during the vote on the Balfour Act is taken from Who’s Who
of British Parliament.51
Income per capita — Income per capita in each county is estimated for each county using
income tax data. Source: Hechter (2001).
Percent in skill-intensive occupations — the proportion of the population in a county that is
employed in skill-intensive industrial occupations. Sources: British Regional Employment Statis-
tics, 1901, Lee (1979) and Hechter (2001).52 Based on the British Regional Employment Statistics,
1901, Hechter divides the total employment in each county into four categories: Agricultural, Man-
ufacturing, Middle Class, and Civil Servant. The Middle Class category consists of skill-intensive
manufacturing occupations (Mechanical Engineering, Instrument Engineering, Electrical Engineer-
ing, Distributive Trades, Insurance/Banking/Finance, Professional and Scientiﬁc, and Miscella-
neous). Employment in theses occupations is used in the regression to capture the percentage of
employment in skill-intensive occupations.
Percent non-conformists — the proportion of the population in a county that are non-
conformists. Source: Hechter (2001).
Percent urban — the proportion of the population in a county that resides in urban areas.
Source: Hechter (2001).
50Any member not listed abstained. Of the 562 MPs, 226 abstained.
51We used only those MPs in either the Liberal or Conservative parties, the dominant parties of the time. The
only other party of signiﬁcance was the Unionist party, but membership in this party was not mutually exclusive
with the other two. Many members of the Liberal and Conservative parties were Unionists as well. In addition,
there are a number of Unionist-only members. Excluding pure Unionists and other members of smaller parties, we
remove 101 MPs from the sample. In addition, we were unable to locate party aﬃliation data on six of the MPs,
and removed them from the sample.
52The British Regional Employment Statistics provides a breakdown of employment by industry in each county
in the UK, an area that encompasses several districts. Unfortunately, the employment data is not at a district level
and each MP was therefore assigned the percentage appropriate to the county within which his district existed.
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Table 1. Voting patterns according to party affiliation and the regional 
distribution of party affiliation 
 
  
 Yes  No  Abstain  Total 
Liberal  19 98 92 209 
Conservative  155 3  94  252 
Unionist  43 0  26 69 
Other  4 14  14  32 
Total  221 115 226 562 
 
 
 Scotland  Wales  England Total 
Liberal  46 20 143  209 
Conservative  18 2  232  252 
Unionist  6 1 62  69 
Other  2 7 23  32 
Total  72 30 460  562 
 
 
  Table 2. The effect of the weight of the skill-intensive
sector on the support for the Balfour Act
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vote on  Vote on  Vote on  Vote on  Vote on
Exp Variable Balfour Act Balfour Act Balfour Act Balfour Act Balfour Act
Income per capita -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0118 -0.0120
(0.12) (0.33) (0.36) (1.33) (1.33)
% in skill-intensive 5.7298 ** 4.1818 ** 4.2554 ** 2.6177 * 2.6171 *
occupations (4.49) (3.09) (3.20) (1.93) (1.94)
% non-conformists -1.9109 ** -1.4129 0.7349 0.7395
(3.95) (1.59) (0.67) (0.67)
Scotland dummy 0.0215 -0.1246 -0.1216
(0.09) (0.50) (0.46)
Wales dummy -0.7289 ** -0.9086 ** -0.9057 **
(2.01) (2.01) (1.99)




Chi-square p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total observations 455 455 455 455 455
Method Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit
Absolute values of t-ratios are given in parentheses
** indicates significance at 5%
* indicates significance at 10%
Vote on Balfour: 2=Yes, 1=Abstain, 0=No
Party Affiliation: 1=Liberal, 0=Conservative
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by countyTable 3. The effect of the weight of the skill-intensive
sector on MP's party affiliation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party Party Party Party
Exp Variable Affiliation Affiliation Affiliation Affiliation
Income per capita -0.0139 -0.0119 -0.0112 -0.0009
[-0.00548] [-0.00469] [-0.0044] [-0.0035]
(1.03) (1.02) (0.97) (0.81)
% in skill-intensive -7.2551 ** -4.6358 ** -4.3282 ** -4.1988 **
occupations [-2.8581] [-1.8287] [-1.7091] [-1.6587]
(3.69) (2.31) (2.23) (2.23)
% non-conformists 3.3908 ** 4.1208 ** 4.2180 **
[1.3375] [1.6272] [1.6664]
(4.66) (2.78) (3.01)
Scotland dummy -0.3227 -0.3936
[-0.1239] [-0.1499]
(0.72) (0.98)






Chi-square p-val 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total observations 455 455 455 455
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Absolute values of t-ratios are given in parentheses
** indicates significance at 5%
* indicates significance at 10%
Marginal effects are reported in square brackets
Vote on Balfour: 2=Yes, 1=Abstain, 0=No
Party affiliation: 1=Liberal, 0=Conservative
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by countyFigure 1. Schooling, Factor Prices and Inequality 
England 1770-1920
Figure 1(b). The evolution of wealth inequality: England, 1820-1913 
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Figure 1(c). The evolution of wages and rental rates: England, 1770-1920






























































Figure 1(d). The evolution of the wage-rental ratio: England, 1770-1920






















































Figure 1(a). The evolution of the fraction of children aged 5-14 in public primary schools: 
England 1855-1920 





























sFigure 2. Schooling, Factor Prices and Inequality 
France 1770-1930
Figure 2(b). The evolution of wealth inequality: France, 1788-1929.  



































Figure 2(d). The evolution of the wage-rental ratio:
France 1820 -1913






































Figure 2(c). The evolution of the real wage and rental rate:
France 1820 -1913






























































Figure 2(a). The evolution of the fraction of children aged 5 -14 in 
primary schools: France, 1830 -1910





























sFigure 3. The Evolution of Voting Rights and School Enrolment
England and France 1820-1925
Figure 3(b). The evolution of voting rights and school enrolment: 
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Figure 3(a). The evolution of voting rights and school enrolment: 
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Figure 4. The evolution of output per 
worker in the process of development
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